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I • IDt.l'OCluot.lon 
With the achievement. ot vict.orr over Japan 1n 
1945, the difficult. taak ot wlnning 'forld War II waa brought 
to oonoluaion. All aegment.a ot Aaer1can aocletJ at that time 
anticipated an era which wou14 uaher 1n the "return to nor-
~ 
m&loy," br~tng with lt rellOY&l ot war- time government con-
trol• am the conversion ot the nation ' a production to peace-
time soods. 
HoatU1tlea !ad aoaroely ceaaed before it. became 
apparent. that our former au,, the loYlet Union, wu coma1t-
te4 t.o a pollcJ of non-cooperation with the weatern deaocra-
. \ 
olea. Rowwer, the probabl e lrlplicationa ot SoYiet poliOJ 
were not at first tullJ appreciated bJ our federal sovern-
JDellt nor the Aaa-ican publio at. large . Our agreements made 
at Yalta, Teheran, aid lotaclaa were oart-ied out, and it waa 
not until tbe blockade ot hrlln that the western democra-
ciea awoke to tbe belated realisation that communism waa 
arrayed 1li an uncompromising strusgle wlth the tree world. 
Prior to a recognitiCD ot the taot that a condi-
tion ot "oold war" 1n truth exiated between the tree world 
and the U.s .s .R. , the United States had juat completed a 
period of rapid demob111zat1on. Beginning 1n mid-1~5. de-
mobilization of American armed farcee proceeded a t auoh an 
accelerated rate folloWing V~ D&J that bJ e&rlJ 1946 it 
reanbled a tull- soale retreat. Appar entlJ the onlJ factor 
tbat held up demobilisat1on to &nJ extent was the avail-
abllitJ ot transportation home tor returntng servicemen. 
1 
The nation's need tor military strength beyond the day of 
military victory was forgotten completely, and few voices 
were then raised 1n protest. 
Demobili zaticn 1n war industries was equally as 
rapid . OTer 2.5 million workere were released from war Jobs 
during tbe month following the Japanese surrender. The term-
ination of W8.l' oontraota and the clearance and releaae of 
plants were aooompli•hed at a phenomenal speed - - 80~ ot 
contracts and 164 billion of ola1Jils being settled by the end 
of 1945. 
from the peak of our industrial strength 1n 1~ 
we demobilized reokleaslJ to a condition of alarming unpre-
pareclneaa during the following five years. In 1944, nearly 
60 percent ot our steel output went to military purposes ; 
1n 1~9 onlf about 2 percent. In 1944, about 64 percent of 
rubber went to the milita17 effort; 1n 1949 it bad declin-
ed to lese than ,.,. percent ot an expanded productiOn . Nine .. 
ty percent of copper was tunneled into war production 1n 
1~; only about t went7 percent 1n 1~9. 
Our armed forces and weapons of defense were also 
rapid~J scuttled. At tbl!t height of forld ar II we had 1n 
exce88 of 12,000,000 men under arms ; following V -J l>a7 we 
decimated the ranks to a level of some 1,700,000, whioh in-
cluded the total number 1n all three branches of the m111-
tarr service z Arrq, BaTJ, and lfarine Corps. 
In the 1igbt of dwelopmenta llh1cb have since 
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taken plaoe, the following oo•ent or Seoretarr ot Detenae 
i1 ohllaon appeara 1ron1oal a 
"Thia oountry emerged from the laat war 
~ as the moat powerf'ul. ot nations, the 
obamp1on ot flaeedoa, and the ~lan , 
ot demoora tlo 1deala. The nation' a 1n-
duatr1al produot1on had reached unp~­
oect•ted peaka . !he national 1noome and 
atan4ar4 of 11v1ng were at the h1gheat 
levels tn hiator,. 
Untortunatel7, we did not retain the 
mUltarr power we needed to auataln our 
poa1t1on and our influence tn interna-
tional attalra . Oont1dtnn ot eodur1ng 
peaoe, we umrS.aelJ J1elde4 to wideapre&d 
preaaure tor s--~· rather than sra4.-
ual demob111sat1on • • • •1 
During t he e&rlf aontha following World far II, 
1t beoaae 1noreaa1nglJ apparent that Soviet Rwlala wae pur-
au1Dg a poltor ot obatruot1on1am 1n the torwu of the Unltecl 
Bat1ona. J'rom flagrant uae of the veto 1n the SeourltJ Ooun-
otl ahe mOYed to outr1Sht bo7oott ot that body 1n her ettorta 
to 1mpoae her will upon the other member nations. The block-
ade ot Berlin oonat1tuted a deliberate abrogation of her 
agreemanta wi~ tba weatern allies reapecttng that city. 
It would be dlttloult to ear, w1 th ~ reasonable 
degree ot exaotneaa, when it waa that the American people 
gained a tull comprehension of the threat posed br ooJDJDUD.1am 
to our vert Y&f ot life, and particularly to our traditional 
aratem ot tree enterprise. Some ooiiJDentators have placed the 
beg1nn1nga or th1a awakenlng or awareneaa at about the t1me 
when open communist asgreaa1on flared 1n Korea 1n late June 
#seoond Report ot the Seoretar, ot Defense, December 30. 1949. 
' 
of 1950. Others have traoed lt. back to the failure of our 
foreign policJ 1n the rar kat &Del the aubJugation of China 
bJ the Redt • Still otlwra haTe put 1 t aa tar back as the 
oloa1ng dap ot World War II and Ruaaia ' a belated ent17 1n 
t.bat oontliot 1n the far Baa~. 
Oerta1nlJ none wlll now deDJ that the outbreak ot 
hoatilitiea 1n Korea greatl7 atlmulated this national aware-
neaa. Jlo longer waa there an, doubt that the ooiiiiUiliata would 
resort to armed asgreaalon to aooo~llah their obJeotlYea. 
!he woetullr Snadequat.e oondit1cm ot preparedneaa on the part 
ot the tree nationa to a .. t th1a attaot beoaJM tr1gb.t.en1nglr 
Olear before t.be war wu a aont.h old. 'rhe Un1te4 States ha4 
~ four diYiaiona atationed on oooupatlon dutJ 1n Japan at. 
the tiM, and oould apare onl.J two ot theae tor the flghtlna 
front.! 
As tJ1e eneaJ foroea anpt. aouthward through the 
ltorMD pen1Daula, t.he Unlted Statea Government apeedilJ ••-
barked upon a bold progNJa deaisned \he rebuild the nation' a 
datenaea. Our ailitarr budget oe111n8 or t 14 bllllon waa 
abuAoned 1n JulJ, the treaident. aaklng and reoeivlng auth-
orisation to increase the armed torcea bJ 600,000 .. n and 
additional &IWI appropr1at1cma of 110 b1111on. !he Alr force, 
whloh bad been trosen at •a groupe, waa instructed to start 
bulldlng toward a goal of TO-groQP strength ae rap1dlJ ae 
poaal ble. Kan7 of our nanl ooab&t Yeaaala were taken out of 
•.otbballa" and made rea4J for reoo .. taaiontng. 
Suoceaa 1n modern combat depend& to a great extent 
upon a nation's 1nduatr1al potential. In Yiew ot the develop-
menta recently toward 1DlprOY1ng the design and performance ot 
long- range a1roran, it i a bJ no meana inconceivable that th1a 
nat ion ' a industrial plant baa been brought within target range 
of the atrategio boaber and guided m1asile. 1hen one coruaidera 
tbia aobering thought, along with the knowledge of the atoa1c 
bomb ' • capacity to ann1h1late, it points up the neoeaait7 tor 
rniaion 1n the conventional thinking and plann1ns of America '• 
leaders. 
fbat atepa, if anr. aball management take bJ way of 
recognition ot or adJustment to deYelopmenta 1n todar'• inter-
national affairs! Cannot management a1mplJ follow a poliOJ of 
•bu81ne•• aa uaual" aa 1n paat eraa of international tenaion, 
until auoh time aa tull- acale war m&J occur! In what war• and 
to what extent doea the defenae program have an effect upon 
industry? Are there anJ oompaniea within the leading 1nduatriea 
which are g1v1ns apeo1fic recognition to the matter of nation-
al detenaet It ao , to what extent are the1 gearing future plan-
ning thereto! The &ru~nra to the•e and a1m1lar questions wlll 
be explored in the pagea whioh follow. 
~erhapa tor the firat t1me 1n history Amerioan man-
agement ia faced with the problem ot providing not merelr the 
weapons and supplies needed bJ m1lit&rJ forcea ab£oad,, but the 
preaervation ot plant o U. and the continuance of operat1orua 
aa well 1n the event of all-out war. 
5 
In th1a treatment ot the aubjeot it should be 
atated at th1a po1nt that the tera "national detenae," 
whenever used ln the text, alao oonn<>tea the broader oon-
oept aomet1mea referred to •• "ut1onal aeouritJ." l'or 
our purpoaea, no d1tterent1at1on between these terms l a 
1D41oated. 
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11. Baokground to MobUisat1 on Plannlng 
A, ljygluti on llld RIJelOQM1t or hrlc1 !ar II Aganglea 
•• a prelude to diacuaa1on or current mob111zat1on 
planning, it would be useful to recall briefly the highlight• 
ot developmEI'l ts 1n Burope prior to America 'a formal entrr aa 
a belligerent 1n World War IIf When tbe Br1tiah pol1cJ of 
appeasement at MuniCh tailed to adn1eYe •peace 1n our time,• 
the European democracie• found themselves ill-prepared to 
withstand the onslaught ot the Nazi wal' machine which quiolt-
lJ followed. On September 1, 1939, Bitler's diviaiona rolled 
aorosa the bordera of J>olani am •ubjugated that nation 1n 
three ween. While Europe wu still gasping, the lazis launch-
ed their next offensive asa1nat Denmark and Norwar on April 
9, 1940. Within twentr-tour hours all or Denmark was 1n the 
handa or the German a. The campaign to crush Norwar required 
OnlJ a few weeks, and waa OOJQPleted bJ June 10, 1940. 
The demoorac1ea trant1oallr rushed to re- arm when 
Hitler'a legions had started to march, but were able to otter 
little more than token rea1atanoe, oharacter1zecl 1n the words 
ot J)ay1d Llord George as "too little and. too late." 
Again the wehrmacht struck 1n the bloodJ dawn or 
llaJ 10, 194-0, - - th1a t1me weatward. Before the end of the 
rear, the faoe ot western Burope had been completely altered. 
Holland, Belgium and Iwtembourg had ceased to exist as nat1 ona • 
i'It is not our purpose here :to tra oe the complex factors lead-
ing up to the outbreak ot the Second orld a.r, but merely to 
lll8llt1on broad developments 1n connect1 on therewith to gain 
per•pect1ve . 
1 
l'rance, with the moat aplend14 &NJ of all the demc>oraclea, 
was auahed. 
!he oollapae of france made the position of the 
Britiah on tbe continent vir\uall.J untell&ble . Hard-preaaed 
aa they were by the Rasia tbeJ managed, howenr, to evacu-
ate the bulk of their t1ght1ng toroea at Dunkerque. Bven 
though the British Y&liantlJ rem lYed to continue the tight 
at all coeta, t.he United States realized at this junct ure 
that it Engl.md were to tall the oomb1ned British and l'renoh 
l'leeta would be turned agalnat ua . 
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X.e41ate detenae needa, tbaretore, nre to strength-
en our armed toroea to hold tbe Western Hemisphere, and to 
aupplJ a id to Britain to preYent her capitulation. Thia meant 
prompt GoYemmem. action to u.ure the moat effective uae of 
our resources. 
In the mi dst of the dram& of Dunkerque, the !Teal-
dent activated the Rational Defense AdYi&OrJ OouncU and the 
Office of b4rgencr llarage.nt. The OBM bad been provided tor 
bJ lxeout1Ye order on Septellber 8, 1939, When the tresident 
bad deolared a state of llllited national emergmcy. This Office 
was to be the point of liaieon between the President and &DJ 
def' enae ea tablirhmen t1 • 
Attention 11 inTi ted to Chart I, page 67, where a 
graphic outline of the denlop•ntt of tbe federal war organ-
ir.ation trom advisor, stages to the mature agencies is pre-
aented. 
Although the apeoitic pow .. a or Bl)AQ were not 
well defined at first , ita membere individually were pro-
minent oitisana and their G1. oae assoCiation with the lrea-
ldmt added weight t o their suggestions. 'fhe Council 1n-
* oluded tbe following Adviaere 1 
Induatrial produotion - William 8. lnudaen , 
president ot General Motors Corporation. 
Industrial •t .. 1ala - Edward R. Stett1n1ua, 
Jr . , chairman of the board, United States 
Steel Oorporat1 011. 
IJaplor-nt - Sic!M7 Hi llman, president, Amal-
gamated Olothlna Work .. a ot .&.m .. ica. 
l'aN products - Ohellt .- C. Davia, tormerlr 
Administrator of AAA, and a Governor of the 
l'ed .. a l ReaS've Board. 
!rice stabilization - Leon Henderson, former-
ly with BRA and TOO and at tbe t111e a auber 
of the Securities and Bxchanea Collllliaaion. 
'franaportatiOD - Ralph Budd, prea1dmt, OB&Q 
Railroad and of the AMrican Asaoci at1 on or 
Railroada . 
Conaumer protection - Harriet Klliot t , pro-
r .. .,r or pol itloal science, Un1versitr of 
North Oarol1Da. 
Secret&l'J - Williaa H. llcReJDolda, adm1nil• 
trative aaa1atant to the lres1dent and liai-
son officer for the O&K. 
'fhe CounCil waa 1n eftect enlarged with in a tew 
weeks bJ an agreement to include 1n all 1ta meet.1nga non-
ald 11. Helaon, exeaut1 ve vice-pr•idct ot Sea N, Roebuck 
6 Oo . , who became Coordinator of Nat1 onal Defense Purcbaaea. 
* 17, P• 160. 
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Staff div1elona were added to deal wlth lnformat1on, re-
aearoh, and atat1a\1ca 1 State and local cooperation, houa-
ln6, and small buaineaa act1vitiea. (8" Chart I , page 67.) 
It na a group without a chairman. Bevertheleaa, 
ertect1ve internal coordtnat1on waa achieved aa a result 
of the apontaneoua appreciatiCft of the m•bera that it was 
eeaent1al to the tultUlmct of their funot iona. 
Attar it began to 1\.tnct1on the MDA.O eoon acquired 
a few apecifio powers. 'lheae might be eummar i&ed under the 
fbllowing categories & 
lJ:1qr1t1t• 1 - !be heeident delegated to HPAO •a 
Jr1orit1ea Board the power given hlll b7 Oongreaa to aaaign 
pr1orit7 to defenae oontracta 1 the JTioritiea Board oonaiat-
ed of :lnuclaen, Stett1niua, and HeDderaon. Belaon served aa 
Director of Prioritiea to oarrr out determinations. 
09'"Qdnrtgg. - !be J'reaidEilt assigned to !mAO 
power of renew over oa-andeering order• of the Secret&rJ 
of War regarding planta of non-cooperating companiea . 
Antitnat. oart1t1.Uqp . - JilT agreema1t wlth tbe 
Department of Juatioa, the l1lAO waa authori&ad to o .. t1f7 to 
the Department firu eligible for exemption trom the antl-
truat laws 1n aot1v1t7 1n the intere&ta of national defaMe. 
Ooptr•t.t, - The .freaident ordered tbe War »e-
part.ment \o eub111t lmportant defense contracts t o the Adv1aer 
on lnduatr1&l 1rodUOt1 on for hie rw iew. 
Ptfenae txptn41tunt. - »efenae appropriation. 
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acta ot the 75th Oongreaa gave KDAO the power to approve or 
disapprove the purpoaea tor whloh the Secretary of War plan-
ned to exPend aa.e 1700 JDillion ilWolved, and to reoolllllend 
projeota tor bia conai&ration. Tbe site- revin activitiea 
of lflllO ateaed from this power. 
Qctiflqat as at n~qesaltx, - !be Seoon4 ReYenue 
Act of 194o allowed tor rapid amortization tor tax purpoaea 
of 4etenae plants under certa1n c1roumatanoea ,. Th1a pr11'1· 
lese oould be ~Wailed or only t.b.rough HDAO 'a certifying aa 
to the neceaa1ty ot the plant and approprlateneaa ot allow-
ing tax relief. 
m prolny, - Oongreaaional Reaolut1on 95 of 
tbe T6th Oonsre•• authorised !VA to make purch&aea without 
regard to llmitattona 1n the !VA Aot lf the B~O detera1ned 
such action waa ln tbe 1ntereata ot national detenae! 
One of KDAO's f1rat atepa waa to attempt to coord1· 
nate ANJ and Bavr procurement 1n order that mazlmwa uae ot 
the Bats. on '• resources aigbt be tacU1tated, eapeo1all7 as 
regarded unused plan ta and unemploJed labor. ntfenae product-
ion wu to be added to civilian production rather than aub-
atituted for it . The Arlq was reluctant to include this oon-
oept 1n ita procurement polic1ea and HDAO bad to remind 1t 
of tbe grant of power to approve or disapprove defenae ex-
penditures. !o set tbe moat out of our productive oapao1tJ, 
u 
••laan streaaed conaol1dat1on of purohaaea, standardization, 
IIDd al&ok per1od t1m1Dg of purobaaea. 
lr1or1t1ea conat1tuted another field where1n eon-
filet aroae with the m1l1t&rJ. lfb.en oapac1t;v atarted to be 
atra1ned on eome 1teaa, notablJ alroratt eng1nea, !WAC bad 
to oppose the wiah of tbe mllitaey to eliminate production 
tor c 1v111an uae1 • bentuallJ, \he NDAO obtained the power 
to applJ pr1oritlea between allita17 and civilian need.l. 
Oloae relatione were uintalned with ~· ANJ and 
.. ., llunitlona Boarcl 1D the atocltp1ling of raw Mter1ala . 
In &441t1on, the IDAC cteaerna IIUoh of the credlt tor help-
ins to launoh a 19 b111lon plant eXpanaion progrq, even 
though thll wu abor'tlJ to pron tar from adequate. 
laportant foundat1 cna were alao laid 1n the man-
power t1e1d.l Hillman auoceaat\11]3 puahed better labor-
management relations and the beg1Jm1ngs of the tra1111Ds-
with1n- lnclletl'f prograa. The approach to the development 
of a labor pol1c;v was along the lima of seeking to util-
ise the un8Dlplored while at the ••• tiM preaerving the 
galu ot the New Deal. 
8J the cloae of 1940 lt bad become 1ncreaa1ns1J 
ole.r that the RIWl waa no longer adequate tor the Job. 
1hlle it had been vested w1 th o• ta 1D veto powers, 1 t did 
laok the posit 1n power appropriate to action prograaa. 
lror a tull diaouaaton or the manpower 1asue 1n detenae 
plam11na, aee Chapter II I . 
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D.. need tor th1nld.ng, plam1Dg, a4Y111n8 had now Men re-
plao~ bJ the greater 1\eed tor opera tiona. !he United Bt.at.e1 
W&l tbe aoknowledged arae1aal of a.aoort.oJ. Organization bad 
\o be ta11ore4 tor aotlon. 
!he pr1no1p&1 IUOGellor to the Bat1ona1 Detenae A4-
v1aOI"J Oounoll waa the Ott1oe ot FroduoUon Management. !h1a 
&f!IIDOJ' was to take OYer thoH ponlona of BDAO work oonoern-
ed with pr1orltlel, m&t4tr1ala, prooureaant, pi'Oduotlon; and 
emploJMnt. 1berea1 the toeua of 1Jipor\ant actlv1t7 wa1 · now 
1h1tt1ng to on aDd the new war organisation• abortl7 to 
appear, the IDAO had 1&14 the plaming groundwork aD4 1D1t1-
ate4 \he aoUon toward 1nduatr1&1 expana1on, wh1oh ·-de po11-
. 
1b1e \be UDp!'*oe4ent.e4 production of thAt war 1eara .that fol-
lowed. 
lundrt other goYemaent agenc 1ea were e1tabliahed 
dur1Dg the 1eam 1~1-1~3 tor the purpoae ot departmental-
1s1Dg t.he var1oua aot1 v1t 1ea ooncerned w1 th mob111~t1on. In 
t.h1a d11ou.a11on w need mention only tbe moat lmportant. 
11th1n the Office of Production Uanasement 1everal 
d1T1a1ona were aet up 1 a LabOr D1v111on, a Dlv1a1on of lro· 
cJuots.on, a Div1a1on ot l'urcbuea, a D1v1a1on ot i»r1or1t1ea, 
and a Bureau of Reaearoh and Stat1at1oa. These oarr1ed out 
the apeo1a1ized 1\anot1ona for wb1oh OIK had been act1nted. 
Howeyer, 1n praot1oe 1t developed that 01'11 waa aErv1ng &1-
IIOBt entirel.J u a ooorcU.nat1D8 cmter and ita uaetulneaa 
ln th18 oapao1tJwaa ahort-11ved. Aocordingl.J, 1n 19o\2 the 
OI'M wu d1aoont1nue4 and 1n ltl atead aroae two powerful 
bodiea a t.l» War Production Board and tbe War JlaDpower Coa-
aiaaloll. !be UB wu ohllrged with tol'IIN1at1ng pol1c1ea and 
111pl .. nt1ng procedUI'ea relating to war procurement and 
produot.t.on . ODe of lta important taakB waa aett1n6 up the 
B-.ller War Pl.ailta Corporation, tbrough whioh the lett1Dg 
of government oontraota wu expec11 ted down to the level of 
aaall bua!neaa. 
. 
!be WIIO waa 11kew1ae ... ted with wide powers 1n 
the field of ampower. a, prea14enti&l Bzecutift Order, the 
oo .. ila1on waa siven auperv11or, authoritJ over the Select-
ive Service Syat•, the United Statea BllploJMnt Service, 
&114 all f\lnot 1ona of the Soo1&1 Seouri tr Board 1n tbe fed-
eral Seouritr Agencr relating to emploJDl81lt ... v1ce. 
S., 194-2 'a al.oae, •ture asenciea were tunot1on-
1Dg 1n all iJQportant areas of mobilization act1vit;r. How-
ewer, reflecting upon tbe proo•• of their development troll 
the Tiewpo1Dt of bSDdaight, •DI of the Nation 'a leaders are 
oou1noe4 we cannot a~1n afford the trial-and-error lll8tho4 
of approaoh. We turn now to conaideration of those aota 
taken ainoe war's end, calculated to improve our aobil1sa-
tlon etf1o tenor. 
I, lrlpg lpal ltdartl Ltg111&\lgn att.or ltr14 t ar II 
1 . Btorgpiy$1on 6Ua at 1945-1* 
Viewed 1n retroapeot, tbe orld War II mob111sa-
\1on -:r be •a14 to haY • beeD a glpntlo labor&\orJ for the 
appl1oat.t. on of the aoo1al ao1enoea. Jrey1oualy untested 
tbeor1ea aDd propoa&l.a ... .,.. put 1nto aot\&1 operation under 
the lapet.ua of tbe neoeaa1 t:r tor expedient• to DlH\ or1t1-
oal a1tuat1ou . 
When the aonf11ot wu ewer, the ex:per1enoe of the 
war ,. • .,.. , ... e4 to 1nd1oat e tba\ ,.,.. of t.he eXpedient a 
were worthf of ~ruaent adoption, t.bat eo• of the atruo-
tural arrange..ata ln gcwei'DIIer4 were outmoded, and part1-
oul.arl:r tbat tbe natJ.onal defe•• atruoture needed cwer-
haul.1Dg. 
Aoocrcu. DS1J, the United Bt.a t• GonrDIIlent ~ 
1ta ftrat atep11 toward rn111cm of 1ta atruoture and pro-
oedurea bJ puaage of the Reorpn1sat1 on Aot of 1~5, wh1oh 
waa extended and ._n4e4 tJ1e following J•ar, 
a, th1a Aot, the OoDgNaa reduced 33 Senate ooa-
a1tteea to 15, and 48 Houae oo•1tt.MI to 19; aergJng the 
a111t&J7 and n&Y&l afta11'1 o_..1tteea of eaOh houae 1nt.o 
•araae4 toroea• oo-1tteea , thll perJiltted unified leg1ala-
... 
t1Ye oona14erat1on of defenae •tta-a, 'tbe Aot al.ao reoog-
n1M4 the goverl'llent ' • reapona1b111t:r tor pl&Jlng a part 
aDd tor ea\abllabtng po11o1ea 1n turtbaranoe of a atab111s-
ed eOODOilJ - It e~rt1a&aed the uae of aome of the teohn1quea 
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&D4 procedalrea of tbe wartS.. ocmtrolle4 eoonOIIJ. 
lroY1a1on wu Dele tor a oouncd.l or tbree eooao-
alo a4Y1aera to the l'l'•lcleDt., V&ualttal to the Oonsre•• 
bJ tbe Pr•14mt of annual reporu on the oountr7 ' • eoono-
aio altuat1011 (lll praotloe, tbHe reports ban been aea1-
annual), and a joint. oammittee of the Houae and Senate to 
make a oont1mJ1ng atudJ of t.he .a:ttera raiaed 1n tbe report•. 
through the enaot .. nt or th1a and subsequent leg1a-
la,t1on tbe govem•nt • de ita t1ret atepa toward atreaal1n-
1ns 1ta procedures tor the job or peacetime mobilisation to 
follow. 
2. lt.oqJmilt Ul at ~ 
!his ia the abbrni&t.ed title bJ m1ch peraona con-
oemed with the matter or national d.etenae refer to the Stra-
tegic and Or1t1ca1 K&terlala &tookplllDs .lot paaaed on Julr 
23, 1946. UD4er the prov1a1 om of th1a .lot the federal goYern-
ment purcb&aea and atorea aater1ala dea1gnated br the llunitiona 
Board aa atrates1c and crlt1oa1. !be Secretariea or the ail1-
tarr departmcta aub•it to Oongeaa ewr, alx aontha a report 
en atookp111Dg aot1Y1t1ea. 
Appropriationa amounting to 61 , 325 , 000 , 000 p1ua 
contract authorlzatJ.ona tor largt additional amounts were ll&de 
tor atookp111ng purpoaea from 1~ through 1949. • 
• 11, P• 208. 
3. lat 1pp•l Saquritr Ul At 1.& 
!hia legislation reorganized the militarr depart-
Mnte and &lao eatabliabld three laportant agenolea to plan 
and operate 1n the field ot 1nd1atr1a1 Mb111zation. 'ftleae 
latter are the Batioaal Seouri tr Reaouroee Board, \be llun1-
t1one Board, the Reaearoh and DeYelopmant Board. AD outline 
and brief deacr1pt1on of the governmental organisation tor 
national security 18 presented 1n Chart II, page 68. 
The Aot provided that it aball be the tunct1on ot 
the Bat1onal SeourltJ Resourcea Board to advise the lreai-
dent oonoem1ng the ooordlnat.t.on of a1litarr, 1nduatr1al, 
N1d 01Y111an 110bil1zation, 1Dclud1ng& 
(a) Polic1ea oonoem 1ng 1nduatr1al and c1Y111an 
mob111zat1on 1n order to aaatre tb8 moat ettect1Ye •bil1za-
t1on and max1Jaum utilization ot the Bat1on ' s anpower 1n the 
eyent ot war. 
(b) Jrograu tor the etteot1ve use 1n t1Dae of 
war ot the Bats. on '• natural and industrial resources tor ail-
itarr and oiv111an needa, tor the maSnteoanoe and atablliza-
tion ot the o1vil1&n eoonoiiJ 1n tlme ot war, and tor the ad-
justment of ltlOh eoonolllJ to war needa and oon4it1ona . 
(o) Polloi• tor un1fJ1n.g, 1n ttme ot war, tbe 
aotiTitiee of federal agencl• and dep&Z"tmenta engaged 1n or 
oonoemed with produot.t. en, prooureant, 41atr1but1on, or tr&D8• 
portation of milit&l'J or olY111arl nppl1ea, materials, and 
produota. 
lT 
(4) the relat1onah1pa between the potential aup-
p11ea of, and potent 1&1 requ1re•nta for, manpower, reaouro-
ea, and produot1Ye tao111t1ea 1n t1ae of war. 
(e) h11o1ea tor eat.bl111h1ng adequate re1enea of 
atrateg1o aDl or1\1oal utC'1&1, and tor the oonaernt1on ot 
the•• reaervea. 
(t) 'the atrateglo re1ooat1on of 1Dduatr1ea, aer-
Y1o•, Gonmment, aid eoonoalo aot11'1tlea, the oont.1nuoua 
• operation ot 1bloh 1a eaaen\1&1 \o the lat1on 'a 1eour1t1. 
!he joint An, and B&YJ ll\m1t1ona Board, *1oh bad 
been or1gim.llJ eatab111hed 1n 1922 tor tba purpoae ot ooor-
41D&t1Dg AraJ and NaYJ prooureamt plana, oeaae4 to exlat 
upon the or•t1on ot the llun1t1ora Board through eD&Otment 
of the Rational Seom-1 tJ A ot. !he new Board waa aaa1gned 
aU the recorda aDd peraonnel or the old. 
the Aot prcw1de4 that 1t aball be tbe tunot1on or 
the lluD1t1oDI Board, under the d1reo\1on of tlMt SeoretarJ 
of Defenae and 1n a\\l)port of the atrateg1o and 1og1at1o plana 
prepared bJ tbe J o1nt Chlefa or Staff a 
(a) 'to ooordlnate appropriate aot1v1t1ea 1f11:b2.n 
the nat1cmal a111tar7 eatab11aO.nt w1th regard to 1Dduatr1&1 
•ttera, 1Dalud1ng t.be prooure•nt, produot1on, and 41atr11N-
t1 on plana of the Y&r1 oua govemmn t departa.n.ta and ageno1ea. 
(b) To plan for tbe ll111tarJ aapeota of 1nduatr1&l 
• 17, P• ~. 
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aob111sation. 
(o) !o reooaend aaalsmaent or prooureaent rupon-
albllitlta among the aw .. al a .. vtoe• am to plan tor atan-
d&rd1sat1on ot apeo1tloat1Du aJd tor the greateat praot.loal 
al1ooat1on ot purOhaae author1tJ, bot.h tor ooaon-uae 1teu 
an4 tecbnloal equip..nt., on the bula of alngle-aerTloe pro• 
oureaent. 
. . 
(4) !o prepare eat s...•• ot potential production, 
prooure•nt, and personnel tor \llle 1n evaluat.lon or the lo-
s1at1o teaalbtlltJ of atrateglo operations. 
(e) To de\trmlne the relative pr1or1t.1e• or tbl · 
w.rloua aegaldta ot tbe alll \lrJ _pro ourement pro~ . 
(f) !o aup~rvlae auab aubor41nate agenolea as are 
or UJ be o:N»ated to oonalder aubjeota talllng wit.hip. the 
general reaponalbllltles ot the Board. 
(s) to •• reo~Ddats.ona to regroup, ooablne, 
or dlaaolve enatlng lnt_.a .. vloe ageno»a operatlnS 1n the 
tlelda ot produotlon, prooure•nt, and dlatrlbuUon 1n auoh 
anner aa to pro110te eftlolenaJ an4 eo~•J· 
(h) fo 11&1nta1n 11aS..on wltb. otJler departments and 
ageno1M tor the proper oorrelatl on ot 11111 tary nq1re•nta 
with the o1YU1an eocmo!DJ', part1oular1J ln regard to the pro-
ouremmt or 41apoa1t1on of atrateglo or or1t1oal •ter1ala 
am tbe malnteMDoe of adequate r~a .. vea ot au.oh •ter1ala, 
and •ke NOOIIIDf:l14at1cma 1n oormeotlon therewith.* 
*11, P·· 205. 
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uaa MlalUsaUoa. • • l\1 -ltWIIllJ .. Ull\1 •I a taaal.-a, 
..., 
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•u• ,laubs 1\atf. !IWI av.tr .u .. m.alY• •• •t •• 
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(f) fta NSRB ia att.e111pt.ing to locate bottlenaoka 
or ehol'tage• and 1a reoomroendins plans tor overcoming thea. 
Det1n1t.e progeaa haa been made in the work ot the 
pro4urtt1on d1T181 em, although the dela7a 1n atatt1ng the BSRB 
bave held \tp aome phuea ot the Job. ·Botable among the earl7 
atep1 1a the maChine tool 1nduatry plan, which baa already 
gone into operation. 
Thla plan6 wbioh npNfla'lte the combined etforta ot 
the Mohloe t.ool industrr, tbe HSRB, and the 11Un1t1ona Board. 
proT14ea tor atand-bJ orden tor 100,000 machine tool•. fheae 
ordera, whi.ch are referred to aa •read1ne•• pool ordere .. are 
beinS placed wl\b the 1n4uatrr now and oan be aot1Yated through 
a1aple l ettera ot intent. 
Aleo, the production ott1oe of BSRB haa aet up "taak 
oommitteeeM to draw up tentative mobilization plana for 1nd1-
T1dual induetr1ee. It 1a the polio., of the ISRB to g1Ye these 
srwpa from industry wide latitude and complete respona1bil1t7 
1n formulating their own PJOSNM, aubJeot onl7 to tbe general 
requ1remmta ~e4 b7 the over-all plan. 
A utaak oo•1ttee" 1• a amall group, uauall7 three 
or tour keJ men trom a particular 1ncluetry. Theilt job ia to 
draw up a mob111sat1 on plm tor their own induatrr under the 
general gu1danoe ot the staff of HSRB. 'thla plan ie auppoaed 
to present an up-to~te analya1a ot the production potential 
of \he entire 1ndWttl'J. In addition to th1a. the pl.an 1a aup-
poaed t o include a 
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V....r \~at Offt• et Deteue ••111aa\»a were •t.U· 
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oa 1Q' 4ttaae ae\ln\1••, a .. .-4 to 1Mt p\\lq •'*' er 1aaa4. 
...... '' .,..... \Ia&\ ·-· 1\epl \owul4 ..... 1 ~· ,.., ... 
&D4 ..... w..U. aa •• ,. - , ... \o preyeat. ra&waJ btlat.loa. 
The Economic Stabilization AgencJ waa designed to pertora 
th1a function ot regulating the control ot prloea and wagea 
through ita Ottioe ot trice Stab111zatlon and ita Ottice ot 
Wage Stabilization. 
The other agencr subordinate to 01))( ia the Detenae 
Jroduot1 on Acba1niatrat1on. Ita function ia to aet production 
goala, auperviae pr1oritiea an4 allooationa, an4 keep Direc-
tor Wilaon a4vlaed on the progreaa of operations. It worka 
1n cloae cooperat1on w1 th agenoiea we have diaouaaed previoua-
lJ. 
S1noe he aaaumed ottlce, Wilaon baa tranamitted 
quarterly report. a to the Preaidmt. Theae report• have been 
u.de avaUable to the general public. They are 1n the cate-
gorr ot required rea41D8 tor -.nag .. nt, lnaamuch aa the views 
expreaaed emanate trom men wbo haTe had auooeaa tu1 oareera 1n 
bua1neaa aa well aa 1n tba Govem•nt. lloreover, there is per-
haps no other publication from whloh the ~1neaaman might 
gain an author1tat 1ve appra1aal trom a alngle aouroe ot the 
job taclng lnduatrr aa the Batlon g1rda tor detenae. 
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power, a wide T81'1etr of methods were tried during the laet 
war. Although the7 1utficed for victorr, theJ also lhowed 
significant limitation• and probablJ would have proved in-
adequate had the pressures or production been much greater. 
The aethoda b7 11h1ch 1ndustrr mar aaaure itself 
of manpower eftectivenes• ln planntng tor a possible future 
emergenc1 m&J be grouped generallJ under the following clasa-
it1 ca tlons: 
(a) Develop1ng essential 1nto~t1on. - fhe basis 
or action 1n planning and operat 1ng a manpower program muat 
be .facts. This goes beyond oompil1ng mere total.s. B:asential 
data must be developed bJ apecif1o industries, skills, geo-
graphic area&, eto., and analyzed in terma of ava ilable and 
potential supply. 'IJlC estimate& were helpful 1n conducting 
t he manpower program 1n the laat war. However, we eball un-
doubtedly need more complete 1ntormat1 on 1n the future to 
aasure effective utilizati on of our panpower. 
(b) Recruitment and placement . - During the last 
war exten11ive recruitment oampaigo.a were conducted; some or 
them were gmeral in nature while others were concentrated 
drive• tor various "must" nr industries. Jubl1o •plorment 
offices were transformed trom agenciea trying to pl ace unea-
ployed persons who were on relief roll.e to pr1aary channels 
for getting active workers hired at better or more essential 
Jobs.* The prestige of employment offices was heightened, 
* 17, P• 221 
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whiCh .till oonatitutea a mobilization aaaet. More than ten 
million persona were placed in each ot the tour war years; 
howeYer, Tolume ia not neceaaarily a criterion ot over-all 
et:rectiveneaa. The t.urn•oTer rate wal rapid, and perhaps if 
placements had been leas, manpower mignt have been utilized 
.uoh more eft1c1entlJ. 
(o) Jlacilitating eaaent1al migrations and tr~­
fers. - War produeti on means expansion, with addit1ona to 
the labor force and lhifta 880gr&phically and between OOCU• 
pationa and companies. However , t'tnding qualified workers 
\fiLS a problem which plagued management througbout the last 
war. The~e are numerous reasons why workers sometimes do not 
wish to move. e1 ther geographically- or from a company pro-
ducing low priority gooda. llxperianoe during the war years 
indicated the ahiet deterrents were transportation and "set-
tling-in" costa, inadequate houa1ng and eommunity taoilitiea 
at tne new location, and tbl tear ot lose of seniority, re-
employment, and other r1ghta. It behoovee management to con-
aider ways and means for facilitating essential shirts in 
ordor to prevent bottlenecks troa developing due to !ack of 
la.bor. 
(d) Increasing productivity. - Lengthening the work 
week 1a a direct means of 1noreaaing production w1 th1n 11JI1ta, 
and is usually a me~~od resorted to very early by management. 
Generally, employee efficienor will not decline a1gnitioantlr 
1f a 5-day 40-hour week ia increased to a 5-dar 50-hour or a 
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6-d&J 48-hour week. But beyond that, aurveya have ahown eft1-
o1encr drops aharpl;y. 'l'he extra ooapenaation 1n overtllle p&J 
will not in all cases otf-aet the diaadvantagea frequentlJ en-
countered when a longer-than-normal workweek is instituted. 
Increased absenteeiaa, fatigue, a higher and aore se•ere aoc1-
4ent rate, lower etr1c1ency aDd llOrale are among the ills that 
r .. ult at leaat 1n part traa excesa1velf long hour.. 
An adequate prograa for increasing product1v1tJ ln-
oludea other method• beaidea longer houra with overtime p&f· 
A well-dea1gne4 apprent ioeah1p training prograa, better work-
ing cond1 tiona, adeq1ate cOIIJIIUJl1t7 fac 111tiea, improTed III&D-
ag•ent-labor relat1anahipa are all factors Which ald. toward 
meet 1ng ~aDded pi'Oduction acbedule • •1 !here are encouraging 
1ndlcat 1ona that manag•ent ia deYot1ng more attention to the 
so-called lr1tang1ble elementa affeot.ing productivitJ• It 1a to 
be hoped the trend ao nt1 nuea and beoo 188S 1ncreaa1nglJ more 
w ldelpread in the f\l111 re • 
(e) Oontrol of Job opportunities. - Thia method of 
IUDpo1f8r planning lihould be •ployed toward the advanced atagea 
ot mobilization. It emilagee, mong other things, the olaaai-
f1cat1on of Joba ae deferable and non-deferable. Under th1a 
aoncept, 1f a man should arbitrarily leave deferable employment 
he becomes 1mmed1atelf subJect to induction into the Armed ror-
cea unleaa otherwiae ezeJIIPt. J'roa the viewpoint of indus tr1, 
39 
11n th1a connection, the 'far };anpower Comm1sa1on cona1dered the 
tra1ntng-w1th1n·1nduetrr prograa one of the outstanding acbieTe-
mmt• ot the entire World 1far II planning. (17, p.224) 
lapoains a •1•t• ot job oontrol la •••ent1al when the prob-
1 .. ot holding keJ men beoo•• aoute. J'roa the viewpoint of 
labor, it 11 the old idea of "work or tight," and ia aooepted 
wbeD oon41t1ona olearlJ de.nd it. Control ot job opportuni-
tiea haa been praot1oed 1n two world war., but onlr to a lia-
ited extent, and we ahall UDdoubtedlJ require a more oompre-
henai ve progrou 1n a future eMrgtllOJ. 
lhlle the po•ible ftriat.iona in a work-or-tight 
program are nuaeroua tbere are a tew baaio element• whioh 
ae• to recur. Indiost.ed elelltll ta ot an 1nteraed1ate program 
would appear to 1Dol.ude the following: 
(1) The require•nt that eaah 1ndiT1dual haa 
an obligation to ._. .. either 1n •••ent1al o1Yilian aotivltJ 
or 1n the Armed roroea • 
(2) Regiatration to eatabl1ah identitJ, poaai-
ble ava11abil1tJ, qualitioat iona, and 11111tat1ona. J'roponenta 
ot th11 el•ent. ad'YOO&te 1Jlolud1ng WOMD &I well U MD· 
(J) Olaaa1tioat1on ot joba 1n ter1111 ot urgenoJ 
am other · obaraoter1at1oa. 
(4) Olaaa1t1oat1on ot 1nd1v1duala in terma ot 
ava1labil1 t7 and obligation to aerTe. Inaotar aa oi T1lian ea-
ploJDlent 11 ooncemed th ia would aean tor manJ regiatranta 
ablplJ staring in their preaent Joba or household oooupationa. 
for othera lt would involTe a requirement to worlt at a Job ot 
a apeoitied or greater urgenor. Ot oourae, olaaaitioationa 
would be aubje ot to appeal and change. 
(S) rao111tat1on of reter.rale to available Joba . 
tbrough the uae of publio •plo,.mt agenoiee 11hioh would 
work 1n oloae cooperation with the 8elect1w SerYioe Sptea . 
While olaaa1t1oat1on ot 1nd1Y1duala might be performed bJ 8e-
leotive 8.rv1oe, the tunotion of Job referral would be handled 
b7 the agenoiea • 
(6) ~a1tion ot olv11 penalt1ea. 1D ADJ prograa 
ot Job control, reprdleaa of what 110d1t1oat1ona m&J be lntro-
duoed, there JNat be included the el•ent of penalties before 
1 t can be eXpeat ed to work. .rut what pun1 t1 ve ••••urea might 
be neoeaau-r muld be dlotated to a lu-ge extent bJ exiating 
ocmd1 tiona. • e have alreaa, aentione4 one 1 that ot aubJ•otins 
vlolatora to poaa1ble lrullot1on. others might include loaa of 
job benefit• and/or reeaploJ118nt rlghta ln one fol'll or another. 
In •'-.rr, the m&llpOWer planning phase ot 110bil1E&-
t1on cona1ate flr•t of recognition on the p~ ot management 
that araU&bl1lty of qualified per110nnel is more likely to be-
come the 4el1m1tlng factor to production than arq other; and 
then designing a program oaloulated to utilize moat etteotive-
lJ &Yailable worltera. !h1a lnvolwea a cr1t1o&1 appra laal or 
labor aupplJ, both actual and potential; analJIIing t h e aourcea 
from which additional worker• llaJ be drawn; 1nat1tutil'l6 auoh 
• thoda u will uaure aa.x1au1a produot1 v1 tr of auch workers aa 
can be badJ and, fln&ll.J, coordinating manpower planning with 
other &apeota ot 1nduatr1al mobilization. 
4a 
Iuotar aa 1n4uatr1al •b111ut1ort plalmlns la oon-
oerDed, the proo\l'eabt of •terS.ala 11 reSU].ated to a great 
ext.ent b7 the &ftlla'ble aupplr or aDd the antlo1pate4 requ1re-
•m• tor the IO·oal.led bUlo •tala a at.eel, oopper, alualnua, 
t1ri, e\o. 811\oe tM llloeptlaa. ot the ut1Cil&l deteiWe progru 
\he OoTernaent baa plapd the pritlolpal. role 1n t.h1a pbqe of 
110b111sat1CD p1Nming, whloh wu to be expected. Henoe, ut.er-
1ala proO\II'ement. planntng trc. t.be atandpoln.t ot 1Dduat17 u 
largelJ a utt .. of aeps.q \be GoYerm11nt 1Df'oJWed or tbe 
quant1t1ea needed t,e pertona oa oontraot1. UDder ~ preaeut 
an-up, tbe Gonrs.ent. UD4ertaba to aee that a OODP.pMt w1U 
DOt 4etault. on a defeue oontrut tor laok of be1D6 able to 
auppl.T 1\jelf nth the· neoela&rJ •terl&la. 
Beoaute ot tM tact '\bat bduatrt plaf'a a •Uppon-
lns J'Ole 1n \hia upeO\ of •b1Usat1on, our d1aw.a1cm 1n 
thia aeOUCD WU1 oenter em ~Ddat.1·ana to •n•ge•nt. 1n 
the 11Sh\ of pYeruamt.al plam'"S• 
Die Oolalt.t.. for •OOIWil1o Dnelop-t, an ~­
ent SJ'OUP or d1at1Dgu1ahe4 bua1n .. amen and eduoaton, baa M4e 
• 
'UUt to11owlhs crnr-aU reoc mrlat 10M regarding procureaent: 
(1) !he 11111tar, PI'OCNN•nt -.no1ea IIWit 4a-
o1de wbat ther want,, how IIUOh t.heJ wan'\, aD4 when t.be;r want tt, 
aa qu1ok1;r, defmitel.J, md tax- 1Jl actnnce u poat!ble. !hia 
• 5, PP• 19-20. 
would be too obY10U8 to mentJ.on lt paat experience dld not 
d•o~trate \he need tor empbula1Dg lt. 
(2) The p~ ot the vartoua procurement 
16enc1ea Jmat be integrated to &TOld competition tor the 
aaae tao111t1ea and tor •q)Onr 1n the aame areae. 
( 3) The 'fOlUDtarJ oooperat1on ot the 1nduatr1ea 
affected. ahOuld lHt 1D'Yoke4 to uaure the ava1labil1tr of mat~ 
erlal.a an4 »lant tor &efeMe production. 
(4) Where vol'Uiltal-7 aet.hoda do not promiae to 
be el1Urelr auttloient, the Oov.-nment abould uae ita maMa-
torr po'Wera to allocate uterlal.a ., ualgn pr1or1t1ea, 11111t 
non-4eten.e proCiuotlon, or requ1att1on auppliea. 
there are tboae who would debate the adv1aab111tJ 
of hav1D8 governmental oontroll on materlala procurement, 
alleglDg that orcUnarr •tho41 ahould autt1oe ahort. ot 1mll1-
nmt poaal b111t7 ot war. But the faot rema1na that oontroll 
are here, and wUl pn» bablJ rsa1n ln force tor some t1ae to 
oome • Therefore 1 t behoOYel •nasement to become aoqua1nte4 
with the prOY1a1o~ t.hereot. 
ltfeotlve aa ot JulJ 1, 1951, the Govert'llllent placed 
the Controlled Mat enal.a Plan 1n ope rat 1on, patterned along 
the linea or the World War II plan. 'thia l'l.u, popularl7 term-
ed OJIJ, ball aa ita a11l the aaauranoe ot a balanced flow ot 
eaaentlal produotioll aid oonatruot1on with a minlmWI ot 1nter-
ta-ence to the civilian eoono.,. 
OU 11 not a pr1or1t1ea IJ8t8ll• It 11 , however, a 
._thod for aoheduling production of defenee and detenae-
aupport1ng iteaa, 1n the 11ght of ut.eriala auppl.J, an4 for 
allooatlng the baaic mater1&18 to aaaure completion of that 
production. ~ • 
1D function, the Controlled Mater1ala llan dependa 
on tbree fundamental ooncept11 
(1) An aocurate and workable yardat1clt to ••-
lUre ••••nt1&1 production needa aplnlt mater1ala aupplJ, 
and to provide a oom.on oont.i'Ol for progren1Jl8 production 
and tbe ue of critical •tarlala. UDder OU, the ~~eaaure­
ment il found 1n three of the ~io aetalac ateel, copper, 
and alUillnua. 
( 2) 0& requlrea acourate information aa to 
the need tor tblae •tala, both aa to tonnase and u to apeo-
itic lhapel and foraa. 
(3) f1Dal1J; approTal of production achechllea 
and the oorreapcm41Jl8 allot..nt ot materials. 
A ooap&DJ 11hoae produota contain controlled aater-
iala hal the "apoa.1b1lit7 of tranalat l.ng eaaentlal produc-
tion needa into JD&t .. lala requlremmta, aD4 aubJiitting \hia 
information to tlle appropriate gover111ent agenor. The pointe 
of oontaot between lnduatry am GoverDII&nt are the clalmant 
agenolee and the lndua ti'J diYlliona ot the Detenae J'roduotion 
Adm1n1atration." fri• oona1•ra of controlled materi&la 
•6, P• 2. 
"••• p. 32 abo••. 
(eontraotora on produot.a 4ealsn&t.e4 "A", m4 pro4uoe.-. ot 
••" produo\a 11b.1oh •e UDder o•> tvrd.o reqUl~t.• ill· 
r.-•1011 to U.1e Gnem .. s IIS•OS.• aa4 obtta1n aut.bor-
lsecl produOt.loll IOU4u1• ad •terlala allot.aellU tr• 
t.t~ea'. 
te liluaV&t.e Ute C.a\roll.H llat. .. 1ala ftaa 111 
operat.ioa, the to11cnd.DS •• tile •Jor 1\~a tb&t woulcl 1M 
\aDa b, 1ft ua ... _., \1w pronrellellt ot a111t.al7 t•alrta 
(1) fbi ~ of Det.w.e de•1:re. a ctua-
t.l\J of a .. naiD t.,.pe uu·, Ul4 Msot.lat.M a oonvaot. with 
OMpMJ I. 
(I) o..pm,. X, tile prt.u eontract.or, 4e\er• 
•lu• a no4ua\1 on aahM&le aDI requil'eMDt.l tor eontreUe4 
•ter1&1J. !be. aouas UD4er the a\1\bol'lt.J of lt.l coatraot., 
Go~ X geta t.ha oollVoUe4 •t. .. lt.la Nqu1raeot.a boa 
lt.a IUppUen ot "A • pi'04aota. ( ".B~ produat. wupt»l1en 40 DOt. 
flaw• la thll 0& OOIIPUit.tl••) 
(3) oo_,_r X \o\ala up tbl ooablnecl HCI'llre-
••t.• t .. the oont.raot, 'bot.h u to quantltlea &D4 clellfti'J 
Hhedallea, &ll4 PNIIIlt.l t.be wbOle p1ot.UH to t~ PNOViDS 
o1&1aant.. aa•MI• 
(4) 1M Depar\llct, of Detenae ( t.u o'lalllltBt. 
aa--7 1ll tbla ••) a44a tile reqUlre•nt.• tor t.h1a t.au oe-
t.nn \o lt.a ot.hw prDSNJII &D4 PI'MellU a tot.al o1aia tor 
oontrol184 •t.e 1&11 t.o t.lll Defaae Jroctuot.1on M•1n1at.ra-
Uoa. 
(5) !be Dete1e ~ot.S.a A4111n11trat1oa •z· 
•laea t.hll ola1a1 &loas 111 \h \hole of ~· otblr ol&~t. 
aaeaolel, wesau the oollblned tot.al 18&1Dat tbl 1\lPPlJ of 
ooat.roUecl •t.rla:S. tor \be perlol ab.HA, &D4 \bell au\bor-
lHI a prograa aiTIIIl &Uot.a ooatrolle4 •t .. lall w eaeh 01&111-
aa\. (lhou14 the ••b1De4 olat• exoH4 auppl.J, or be c1HM4 
to n\ WO 4Mpl.F ~0 the OlYll.lail. NIOl"'ttlr of OIIJ .. taU, 
olalu •7 b• ou\ Nek. ) 
(') 1M Dep.-taeat. of Deteae, DOW b&TiDs a 
total allotaen\ of ooat.ro11ect •ttr lal.J, breaa th1a aUo\-
•nt 4nD •oDS lt.1 ••r PI'OSJ'UII aooor41Da t.o ltl 4etera1-
aat.loa of relat.S.Yo bpor\aDOe. 
(T) rer ,. \&8 oonuan ln queatlcm, \be De~ 
panaent. of Weue thd sl•• Cla.pUJ X aa autborlu4 pro-
4uot.lon aabe4ule, ua allot.aent. of oont.rollecl ut.-1&11 &114 
an alloues llUQer, aa4 &lao UIUH a Deteue Order (DO) 
ra t.J.Ds tor t.h e prooure•at. of ••" pro4un ooapo!*l\1 • 
(8) rt.11J, o.pu, X paa1e1 on to lt.a aup-
pllere the a1~ .. , aD4 the DO rat.ua, 110 t.her oa obt.aln 
the requlrecl aoll\r011e4 u.telala ad 111" prodl1ot.1. 
WhUe t.h.eae operat.lDS at. epa UDder a• pl.&oe &ll 
enra burclea 'btroD4 the noN&l flow of ouat.oaer-1uppller 
relatlonmlpl, t.be re.alt.lDS a4ftlltas• would aHa t.o ou\-
we1Sh the lnooDYIDlODOe. Oil tbe o• band, the Defeaae lro-
4ilet.1on Adalnl1trat lon OM be aure \bat \Otal produot.lon 
plallne4 for aDJ perlo4 S. ln 11M wlt.h the auppl.J of •t.er-
lala, &Dill ea paftllt.• that. b •t .. l&la will be a....U.'ble· 
Oa • other bald, ID"'•I \1'7 ean 'be -.re that all OOIIPOJI8Dtl 
of a epaplloat.a produot. 1rl11 'be pi'041loe4 aDd 4e11ftN4 ill 
~e qQ&ft,lt.ltt aa4 at \bt \lat theJ are Deeded to tara ou\ a 
flal1Md 1Mit. 
lat.Ui'all.J, n wa14 DOt wlu to IU88•1t \bat an 
1n4ua ti'J adopt a paal1 Ye a \t.ltwte 1r1 thole oaiH wheN 1 u 
pl'04uet 11 Mlt.Jielt dlN«*lJ 1101' 1D41N0\1J OODOeftlecl Wltll 
4.ta~e pJIOc1aaoUcm. rr~ell\ 11 a oontlmllas and~ 
~··' p-o'b~ of •Daa--t, •tb• a 1Jidllati'J s.a •-
,._ e4 1a »r••I.Ds detente 1'- _. soo41 tor o1Yl11&D ••-
auiQ)Uon or Mth• lefSU41NI of tbl 11M of aa. iduiWJ, or 
&BJ eollp&DJ' wJ. thin • lDIUI\rJ, proeure•nt p011olel at. all 
1ne11 are llltl.ueee4 liJ t.be clefeue eoonoar UDAer whloll •• 
U'8 pNICt.lJ 1J.Y1D8• 
With \hia ~ la ld.D4, the follow1ft6 polJlta 
lhoultl 'be fcnuki belpt.al te a•aaeaeat, part1oulai'1J MDII• 
faotver•. ln a4J11d1Jis proOUN•at pollet to \Od&J'I eoa-
• 41 t.ioDIII 
lpeolal u•lsna U4 ua-ltaftllard l'- •r lnONAie clellYer, 
u .. u INOh u oae t.o fCNr aoatlul. 
(2) lupplJ ooaple\e lDtorDtlcm wlt.h tbe ercter. 
lal111N to Sift 4e\alll •1 DHMiltate ndeal8ft1DS &D4 haM 
oa•• liMCUeaa 4elaJ•• 
(') WalYe a:peolal , .. ta wbeu.,... poul'ble. 
Yl1 ~le \lalt OM be •IUIU-.4 u••'b11DS all :pVaoDI Sa· 
'f01Ye4. Mau.l•\urer'a tloer apaoe 1i \1e4 up. lpeolal 
, .. , aet-~ 08D be ooa\lJ. 
(4) ls;,.Ut.e apJnftl of clranDSJ. -pron.l 
at the ••t•,urer•a plaa\ wUl eltmtnate auoh ooneapoD4• 
•••• 
(5) Jlaee ol'4tra MrlJ• A few dafl' 4ela7 Ia 
~tlaol.D8 an ord.- _, en.t4 4el1T_,. 1nwa1 wMka. for 
lpMial•PvPO•• eqm.p.llltt, 1\ _, .... aeYWal aoatba aor.. 
(') AYD14 obans• atwr order baa bMQ plaee4. 
Dea1p oban&• foroe4 Oil QpW\MSI WOI'klDS &\ oap&ol\J 
ua oaue ••en out-HOb 1n outp&\. !hla W1U atteo\ other 
or4••• tl ... 
( T) OJt4er 4up11oat.• equpaell\. •qotla \lou 
a4 •asiMerlDS U•• ._ '- wSA1alle4 1t 11a1lar equlpMa' 
,lt IQ'OOurecl, a4 ~• \t. •- wmuataot.urer. 
(I) IMp &1\•JW.t.e propoaala \o a wtnl-aua. 
tu.obaaert~ 1bould aak for ea\la&W prloe ancl l*'tonanoe 
4a\a oDlJ o~ al\trna\el. lear lll •iDA \hat prepara\lOil of 
4et.a11e4 4at.a \ak• \S... 
( ~) Acree to poaa1 ble aubl\1\\1\lon of uMr-
la1a. Reaeliber t.ha\ when aoaroe • t.zolala AN lnT•lye4 4e-
11ftr1• are 11kelJ to be ae1a,.a. 
( 10) hUow •• \abltahecl Pl'A prooedurea wure 
applloable •. rz.octuoU on w111 be h1D4ere4 br at.teQt.• t.o 1hon 
oll'oult. or 41•nsard 1et. prooec1DNI• Oooperat.lon wlt.h DI'A 11 
•••ent.lal. 
3. rtau •a•Milt• M4 Re1tgttga 
!he l&t1om.1 ••~1\J Aot of 1941 takel ooplu.noe 
of the ftl.Ur.b111\J of \he latlon '1 oonoentrat.e4 1114u\1'1&1 
an4 pop\llat.1on pat.t.erna, &B4 wtruot• t.U latloDal leovltr 
b1ouroH Beard to ooaa14er •t.M ltnt•sl• relooatlon of 1a-
4uatr1el, l•r¥1oH, Pfti'DII•t an4 eooDOalo aot1Y1t1el 1 the 
oont.lnuou operation of nloll 11 e11ent.1al to the lat.lon '• 
... 
••ovtt.r. 4 
flU• nat.IDD&l pellCIJ' 10 w14elr aooepte4 u t.o haTe 
a le&illatlft baa• ref1Mt1 \be srow1BS awareu•• of t.be ha-
sard.l of the atoalo ... , &D4 Uaa .wel'-oone•ntntlon of our 
bduatri&l \eolulolog. !be retpou• \o botll hal 'been soTern-
MDt •noouraa•ct., 'tNt TOluat&rr print• iaple•li\at.lon, of 
cteoonoenvatlc:m of lDib&nrr aD4 4nrb&D1sat.1on of popUlat1oa. 
O..r a per1o4 of \1M 1 t 11 bope4 \hat. t.h••• aoY~t.• wlll 
J1e14, lf not abeolut.• 1eour1 \J, •' leut partial 1D4utr1&1 
prot.•ot.lOD, &Dil 111 •r • .,.., bet\er work1Ds aid 11Y1Da oon-
41\lon•• 
u a••Nll.J oonoe1Te4, the tar. "411pera1on" N• 
fer• t.o t.u 1bort-t.era rea.rraaseaen\ of ld.plJ 1tratepo 1D-
• IH Ohapt.er II., leotloll ' (f). 
duetr1ea tor urgent security x-eaaona. The term "relocation" 
retera to the normal rearrangeMnt over a lona apan of tiM 
ot plant replacement and ezpana1on.• 
The R8RB haa wlaely followed the general rule of 
"economic teaa1b111ty" 1n th1a aatter, and placed ll&jor ••-
pbaa1a on the long-tera probl• rather~ on the ahort .. 
tera expediency. I Bo goveru.nt coercion baa been put upon 
management to effect a wider plant d1aperaal. 
Revertbeleaa, a a1gn1t1cant trend toward reloca-
tion appear• to be under way, undoubtedlJ apurred to aou 
ext.ent by the nat 1onal detenae program. It behoove• manage-
ment, therefore, to recognize th11 feature of the t1me1 and 
plan accordingly. 
The aa.rd1ng of detenae oontracta and the grant1Dg 
of cert1t1catea of neceaa1ty a1ght be viewed aa 11 1nd1reot .. 
means wherebJ the Government oan toater plant relocation. 
Alert management baa obaenecl that th1a 1a already beginning 
to be evident. •• Although tbe Iouth Atlantic atatea bad, in 
• 11, P• 61. 
lin th1a connection, Banaon W. Baldwin baa eat1JD&ted that 
the coat of deoentral1z1ng the large urban areaa of the 
Unit.ed Stat•, and of break1Dg thea up into d1apereed oom-
IIUJ11t1ea of not more than 50,000 peraona eaoh, would be 
about 1::500,000,000,000. luoh 4eurban1zat1on, he atatea, 
would •an a bu1o ohanse would reault 1n our entire aoo1al, 
eoonom1o, and polltloal ayat.eas the enormoua 1:apl1cat1ona 
ot it atagger the 1aag1nation. 
**see Table I, p. 70. 
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the &(S8reg&te 1 01117 ~ Of total V o& • 11&DUf&Otur1Dg 1n 19471 
their ahare of taat plant write-ott aao\Ulted to 10.4~. hen 
JIOre a1gn1t1o&nt 1& tbe 1ndex tor the Mountain atatea 1n 
that rear: 1.1$ of t.otal U .a . ~aotur1ng aa coapared 
with 2.8~ or certificate• of ~cealit1 awarded. Tboae atatea 
with tbe preponderance of u.mataotur1ng received, 1n moat 
oaaee, 1eaa than their antio~ted ahare of oertitioatea. 
Tbia ia but one of tbe II&DJ "bal-outera" indi-
cating the continuing trend of new plant• to ~ south and 
'feat. It 1a aafe to a&J that add1t1onal 1mpetua would 
appear to ha•e been glven thia movement with the advent 
of national detenae aotiv1t7• ll&nage•nt woul4 do well to 
face up to it 1quarel7 in plannlns tor the fUture. 
Admittedly, management planning 1n this area of 
1nduatr1al aobilizat1on ia ot the tJPe requiring rears of 
carefUl anal7a1a and perbapa deoadea to oarry out ono.e de-
o181ona are reaohect. The f.,tora 110t1vatillg the obOioe of 
location for new plant are OoJiplex and n.ried. We ba•e 
auggeated there is at 1-t one new factor Which 111 leg1-
t1matelr deaC'viDg ot manag•ent '• attention 1n thia area 
of planningz nuelJ, preaervat1on t.hrough deooncentrat1on. 
51 
IV. Management Aapeota of MobUization 1'1Mn1ns 
'. CJtpepl Ors•nt ytiopal Nttro. 
Aa auggeated earlier 1n the text, we haw now 
reached that point. in our 41aouaa1on where we oan oonaider 
aapeota of adJuatllent to tbl defenae effort at the level 
and troa the viewpo 1nt of OOJip&JlT manageaent. 
IDaaliUoh u an entire organization would be af-
fected eventuall7, it an all-out eMrgenor 4evelopa, the 
reapona1b111tJ tor oo~ .obillaatlon planning reata 
with top Mnageamt. General.l.J, 1n aoat oo~~pmlea wh1oh 
have drawn up a aobUizat1cm plan or at leut have one 1D 
preparation, the prea1dent ia mquentlJ dealgnated to 
aot 1n the oapao1t7 of dlreotor of 110b1lizat1on. • He 
uauall7 delegat ea auoh of hla ataff and line exeout1vea 
aa he dee• neoeaaary to ua1at hla. llobUiu.tlon proble• 
are e1~r oonaidered on a oo.a1ttee baala or theJ are 41-
reoted an4 coordinated 1D41v14uall7 b7 the ohlef executive, 
depend1ng on the OOapaJ '• operat.lng policJ. 
To avoid overlapplng and duplication of effort, 
aoat OOIIp&Df JIObilisati em directors adviae the olear defi-
nition of all planning reaponaibllitiea and areaa of taYea-
t1gat1on. Otten thla ftmoti on ia expedited through an appro-
priate ateertng committee. In oaaea where a oompanr baa mul-
tiple plant. looat1ana, it. 1a OUitom&rJ to delegate looal 
• 10, P• 1· 
»laD\ .. bl11aa\1on plannlns reepoaalb11lt7 to the la41Y1· 
4\1&1 •ba&*l'• Altbeup \be lou.l plant •anapr la ._..,. 
e4 M GOD81cle1' all f&o\ON wb.leh 1JOU14 atteo' hla eper&• 
Uou 41U'llls a e..-paOJ, hla tiDal plan1 are de.elopect 
1D aooortaoe with \he paeral •'bUlsaUon pollol•• of 
\he u.e offloe. Jlownoer, looa1 plad wnagen ua-.ll.J 
haTe a YoS.oe lD \he tenlo~a of tbe1e polloSe•. 
Aaot.Qr UpeOt s•eft11J •oaon \0 tOJip&DlOI 
haf'lDa a M'b111sa\1011 plaa 11 \II&' a lpeOl&l effort u 
.a. w iao1u4e top eaed1YH wl\!l 'for14 We II produ· 
'loll •xperleDM 1Jl \be plhDlq e1 S\\M &lllatill& \be 
4lreeter. 1M •u,Notln 1._. an4 •1188••\tou of tuae 
wlth Wor14 '1&1' 11 •JIPOrleMe &1'0 \ban'bJ ob\a1De4 all4 •-
Yalua,ecl. 
le ltlttM4 'DR\11 tf IMtUlt 9nMP! Vepe 
1. "'I lll.a. 
!be le\t.en of t.llu ooapaaJ '• _. repreaea\ \he 
ftt11 t.l\le of •noaa trpe l'nn4era, Ia•orporat.ecl. Botrenr, 
tM UbreYl&t.tMI ,_..of alllplJ •Au, ~ae.• wu ott1ol.a11J 
.... 
&Mp\414 l\IU II, ~. 'fhU OorpGN\loa la OM Of~ eoa-
\J-711 1M41aa aematanven of a ••let. 11M or prlnt.ln& 
eq1tlpMDt. an4 ·~llea, lulwts.as ,,. an4 •obt.urr. 
AU, lao. ua U.elopel a 4e\alle4 aol»lllsat.lon 
plaa ewmaa the ftl'lect •••'anurt.aa aot.lYlt.S..a of 1u 
lb opera\lq 41Ylalou. Lib aar o\MI' toii,P&Dlea, A'tr, lao, 
II&JIII •~»Ulsat.lon pluniq \he napoul'bl11t.J of \op -.a-
1M OOIIp&DJ baa appoldel \be Yloe-pr.1ctet. of 
nss-erms aD4 preau.u. • aa obal~ ot \U b4•tr1al 
prep&N4Dua .. ..t, .. e, A\t.eat.1• 11 liiY1M4 \e Ollar\ Ill, 
1Jl l.'fr, Ia•• &Del l\a • ._t.4laftaa, lh1l orpalaat.ion lJ pn-
41.eaW en \he ooapeaJ'• Wor14 War 11 ••rlenee t.a baaAl ..... 
• aore t.baa 1110 a1Uloa 1n priM &DI auocnat.raet.a. 
koh ••'bel41&rJ bU appolnt.ect aa 1D41l•t.r1&1 pn• 
paredae•• oo•lt.t. .. \o proYlcle proapt. and adequate llal•oa 
'M\weea soY•naeat, pi'MUNaODt. otfloea &D4 all proc1.110t.lon 
alt.a of t.be ooapan7. the aeaNr• of eaoh oo•l\t.ee are \ep 
•11, P• 38. 
naklJls ODOU\lYOI wile WON OloiOlJ &II001at.04 Wl\h 1a4U-
t.rla1 &D4 soY•raae~l ao\1Y1t1el 4ur1D& Wor14 War II. 
ObJeo\lYH of \he AU, lao. •blllsat.lon plall 
(1) to prn14o pYera•t. prooureaent. aaeaolol 
wl\h all requlro4 tDtor.a\loa on tao111t.1ol, pro4uot.l, &D4 
pereouol. 
(2) to panlolpat.e wl\h sonraaent. aanolel 1D 
pl&DD1Da lrl4unrl&l pNp&N4aea1. 
(3) to eoor41u.t.o aD4 •zpo41t.e the pro4uot.1on 
ae\1Y1tle• of all wait• of \be oo.panr •• requlre4 br \he 
Ane4 lonlMI of the VD1te4 1\at.o•. 
(4) to Uloaltlo lla\1 of po\en\lal 1\lbeont.rao\-
ora, 1oourtns troa \~ llatl of t.belr taollltlo• an4 por-
Mmael lD \be ~- tON u prepare4 bJ the OOQ&DJ• 
(5) to •• OOIIPUJ flDaDil&l 1t.reaat,b, 1poolal 
aklll• &D4 other 1peolal &b111\1ea to ooor41nato aD4 luper-
Ylao ao\1Yl\1el 1n \be tadu1tr1&1 prepare4De1a prograa.• 
In e&rrJlns out. 1\1 prosraa tor aob111sat.lon, 'he 
OOapallJ 11 llua1\lOM flto4U\I DlYlllOil (IH Ollar\ III) IOI'YOI 
u a oell\ral l.rYloe sroup tor all scwernaent oont.raot• &D4 
operatlona. I\ alao 1peo1a11... lD all pba••• of 11lb0ontru\-
1BS· !hla 41Y1110D wu to\ID4 t,o haYe been ••rJ uotul ln \be 
w14oJprea4 hbooat.rao\lD& aot.1Yltl•• of Atr, Ino. 4vlas t.ho 
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1u\ war. tllrouab auell "11\ral.lsa\1•• a8MilVaetlq work 
wu eoulwabl.J expe41te4. 
AU, lao. ua al80 requ1N4 eaoh Ju,.ldiWJ to 
olaaalf'J' all eplo,.•• 1fbo .lllsJI' be reprded u aueep\lble 
to poaal'ble lllU\&17 •••loe. !W aa\er lla\1 h&Ye beea 
pNpWecl bue4 upon tate t.atol'lll&lon JUlal\t.e4 t.e tM »t.re•-
\or ef •••n llelatlOMI \be fiN\ laolu&U.l\8 all MD M\1rHB 
\he ..... U \o .S, \be •••114 lul.UDS all •• who are--
• MN of uq Nltrn o..,o•d ef \he &rM4 foro• • 
Alt. •plOJM e\erlas \be ame4 aen-loea, whe\her 
bJ YOlu\_., allat.ea\, 4Nft, e:r aa a •U.r ot a ... _..,. 
toroe oalled t.o •t.lft c11at.r. 11 sraate4 a 11111\arJ 1•••• of 
abHD .. troa t~ ooapuaJ. !hla ••• \hat. h1a •-.»lo,..n\ ll 
proteot.e4 &114 that h1a ••n•• e:recllt.a for •-.»lor•• beMtlt. 
prosr- iDYolYS.as 1en&\ll of aernoe an ao\ lat.errvpt.ed. 
llaYSJas olud fle4 Ul•• aplore•• llhoae MM"loea 
the OOJIPDJ' oaa reuoaablJ •t.lolpa\e 1Hlng 4urlng u -r-
PM1, ••aa••t. baa preW na r.rther ln\o \hil area of 
•'blllsat.loa plllmln&• file la\eraal poalUoa of f.he. OOIIp&IIJ 
hU Mell aalJsed wlt.b \be YleW Of 4e\ .. 111nlDSI 
(1) halt.lo• **" Ute~ abonaa• eo\114 1ae 
e•t.roUe4 UirOup ~lq ef WOI'~ bo\11'1' 
(2) Opera\10111 01' fae\10DI wUN penozmel 
ea H •nt.ro11e4 throUS)l \he ellabat.lon ef part. or all of 
• 10, P• U. 
the 110rk done • 
(3) Areu where labor ahortagea cannot be con-
trolled bJ enena1on ot worklDg houra or work e11m1nat1on, 
but where reuelgnaent and up8ftd1Dg II&J help. 
(4) Poa1t1on& aDd. operation• that, tor the e-
aergencJ, could be handled by woaen, retlred •ployeea, part-
t1• worker•, the partl&ll.J dlaabled, etc. 
(5) Orpn1u.Uoral area• preaentlng .DO 11kelJ 
• labor ahortas ... 
Th1a tln point ualJala 1a ezapl&rf ot the anent 
to 'tlhioh the anag•ent ot A'lr, Ino, hu gone 1n planning tor 
aob111nt1on. Other aoapaniee luwe ooncluoted aoMwbat ela11ar 
internal im'elrt lgat lone, 1n wldelJ n.rrlDs degree a, ot th1a 
the aoet oruo1&1 phaae ot planntns. 
2. lAppen OPII'QRJ, lu.s. 
!hi a nat1 onal ~orporati on 1a a producer ot orude 
and ret1ne4 ooal tar produota &D4 ob.ea1oala related thereto; 
a lao ooJte, Pis 1rOD and sa•, •ahlne abop and toundrJ pro-
duota. Ia add! tlon, the Ooapa:ar'• auba141&r1ee delign and 
oonat:ruot 'bJ-prodUDt oou planta, ohamloal plmta, bl.ut 
turnao• • open hearth turnaoea, oo~~plete eteel a111.8 and re· 
late4 auxlli&rJ equ1pmen\ &DI1 at.ruot.ur•. 
'1M prlurJ objeat.1T• ot t.M 1ncluatr1al aobil1sa-
t1on plan ot ltoppera Company, Ino. are a 
• 10, P• 2l• 
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(a) To aid 1n prnentlng,. if poaaible, a third 
world war through lndnatrial preparedne•a, and 
(b) !o keep tbe GOIIPEJ 1n a poa1t1o:n of rea41-
nela at all t.1MI to aupplJ' proapt.l.J and aocuratel7 auab. 1n-
toru.t1on •• the Jlunit1ona Board or the ArMd s .. Yicel aar 
need. 
!he aeoondarJ object1Ye of the plan 11 to afford 
all leyela or management, from plant manager to president. 
an opportuni t7 to \aJDI aook of plat and equip•nt and to 
visualize new prodllcta tbat the OOJlPEJ' might profitablJ Mlte. 
A atatemct 1ett1Dg forth 1n gm .. al ter. the 
thtnk1ng WhiCh underl1ea loppera planning 11 quoted belowa 
"The reapona1bU1t.J for our oountrr be1ns 
-prepared tor &D7 e•rsencr reata not onl7 
w1 th ibe m111t&rJ but. alao w1 th the c1v1-
11&D population, partloularl7 with 1ndua-
tl'J'. !be requlre•ntl ot the Armed Sery1oea 
and the •••mt1al. o1 Y111an eoono111 llWit be 
ooapared with our abU1tr to produce thea. 
Thla abilitJ to produce oan beat be .. a-
aured bJ a or1t1oal appralaal of our OYer-
all D&t1onal 1Dduatr1al potential. 
• 12, P• 35. 
". • • • • ·file total ot our phfa1oal an4 
h\IIIILD reaouroea uke up our national indua-
trial potential. A bade at4tp 1n achieving 
ln4ultr1al prepareclMII 11 tbe detel'lllD&• 
t1on lt7 inc!uetrJ ltaelt of ita 1nduatr1al 
potent Sal, OOIIp&DJ bJ CDmp&IJI, and plant 
bJ plant. lhould a third world war ooour, 
great aaTingl will aoorue to the D&tioul 
eoono., bJ reuoll of Jmow1ng in adT&noe what 
eaQh f»l'p&DJ arll eaob. plmt oan belt pro-
"'oe.• 
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Ill order to ..S.nta1n an actiTe rather than a paaa-
1Te attitude toward mobilizat5on plann1ng, Xoppera Ooap&DJ 
haa prepaz-ed a oheok l1at ot 111partant po1nta aa a guide to 
aelt-appraiaal. It u 4rawn 1n the tol'll ot a aet ot queationa, 
intended DO\ ao auah tat' apecd.tio anawrw but aa a aeana ot 
at 1Jiul.at1ng retle<*iTe tb 1nlt1Dg on tbe part, ot management. 
Selecting a nmlber troa the l1at, we t1Dd the following quer-
1ea to be a repreamtat iTe oroaa-aeot, 1ona 
BaTe World War II pl&Dt I organization obart.a 
been NT1ne4 1Jl the light ot reoent ob&Dgea 
and a poaaible future e•rgenoJ7 
Ru the plant '• pl&oe ln aob1l1zation ot 1n-
chlatrJ been exa•Sned 7 
Baa the tuDot1on ot .ob1l1zat1on planning 
~en uaigned to exeoutivea f&llll1ar with 
tbe ope rat 1Ds probl•• that &J-Oae dur1ng the 
lan wart 
BaTe theae exeout1Tea been given adeqla te 
authorit7 to get oooperation troa operat1Ds 
depart~ta? 
How woul.cl an •C'SeDOJ atteot the plant •a la-
bor auppl19 In Tin ot the plant 'a e~~plo,.ent 
pattern, muld all-out IIObiliaatlon r.ult 1n 
the lo&S.Dg ot a hlp peromtage ot the worlt-
tcroe? 
Haa proviaion be• llade tor training, upgrad-
ing, aDd •oollT8rt iDs" the worktoroe? 
Do• tbe pla:nt DOW baw a &JIItea ot tra1n1Dg 
replaoe•nta tor ex11t1ng kef peraonne17 
How MJ'Q' &ddittonal auperviaolrJ •plor••• are 
likelJ to be needed 1n tbe ., ent ot expanded 
war•pro4uot1on? 
I !he ward "pl&Dt" 1n th1a lia tlng ia uaed to uan e1 t.her a 
phJaioal produotion un1t or the legal er&.ltJ ot a Ocap&DJ. 
lbat hu bem the labor hiatorJ 1n the plant 
with respect to turnover, atrikea or the 
threat, of atr1kea, general IIOral.e! 
Are the plant 'a 1nduatri&l relatione polio1es 
and procedures, ourrent and propoaed, ade-
~uate to meet ... rgeno7 oond1tiona? 
Are aerYice taoilitiea and aoooamodation8 1n 
tbe plant autfiolent tor an ezp&Dded work-
toroe, part1oul&rl7 where a larp 1noreue 
1n the nWDber of fe-.le e~~plo7eea alght be 
ant1o1pated! 
aa. aDJ •J•tematlo plan been devised looking 
toward plant aeour1t7 and damage control 1n 
an emerpno7? 
Hu a oaretul. l'ft'ln been 11&4e ot the &been-
tee record 1n tba plant, and the •Jor rea-
aona therefor oloael7 atudled! 
Have plana been deyeloped to hold the work-
force 1D an eHrgenoJ againat "labor plrao7" 
1n th* abaenoe of, or untU establ1ahment of, 
a national e~lOJaent atabillzation prograa! 
Would the wage 1Doem1ve plan and tbe Job 
en.luatlan prograa have to be rev1aecl UDder 
e•rsenoz oontU. t1on.t It ao, 1n wbat part,i-
oulan! 
It 18 bJ auoh ori\ ioal aelt-appraiaal aa these two 
OOIIp&niea have -.de that manaSt•nt oan en.luate the 11lpl1oa-
t1ona of national defenae for 1ndu1tr7. iTery organization, 
large and aull, ahould aonduct a aillllar an&lJsis of 1ta po-
sition 1n 1ta 1DduatrrJ toreoaat to what extent all-out aob1-
11ut1cm would be 11kelJ to atfeot plant, product•, labor, 
eto.; and then 4eo1de, at leut. t.entat.1nl.J , wbat atepa are 
to be taken to cope etteot.lvelJ wit.h tbe situation. 
•1o, PP· ~-67. 
V. Iapllcationa ot Intlation on the BoonoDIJ · 
It hu been aptl.J stated bJ the heaident and 
othera 1n poai t1 on ot leadership \hat econoaio 1ntlat1on 
alone, it uncontrolled, could aerioualJ oripple our nation-
al detenae prograa and ultuatelr en4•nger our verr aeouri-
tJ - - we though the Ration were never attaolted bJ aill-
tar;r agsreaaora. TheN tore, our dlacuaaion regarding nation-
al detenae would not be 0011plete wltbou\ oo-mt1ng at leaat 
brletlJ on the ~ot of 1ntl&tion thereon. 
Mobilisation poaea a greater 1Dflat1on&rJ threat 
to the latlon '• eoono111 DOW than at the 8t&rt ot World War 
II. 'fe atarted tbe preaeut mobilization with vlrtuallJ t\11.1 
eaplo,_nt.. Ill 1941-45, we aould add ll million t.o the Ana-
ad Poroea &D4 1 million to the emploJed membere ot the labor 
~~arket b7 drawln8 on new entrant• to the labor market and 
* reducing uneaplOJMnt. bJ 8 million. Tod&J, tbeae reaervea 
are not aYallable. 
fot.al output increased by 10% OYer tbe period be-
twHn 1939 to 1945. With f"enr Mn-houra ot output to oount 
on ahould we go into tull aobUlsatk»n, thia altuatlon would 
verr 11ltelJ reault 1n a aoarc1tr ot colUNiler sooda. An ex-
-
oeaa ot dollar• 1n the ban~ of the public would then be 
bidding tor tner avaU&ble oou\Ber good•J oonaequentlJ, 
prelaurea on the general price level would tend to force 1\ 
• :5, P• 5· 
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Oontrol•, to aome extent, b&Ye aided 1n ourblng 
the evil• whioh are brought on b7 inflation. However, the 
reoord or the preaeut. 4dm1n1at.ration aeeu to 1nd1cat. that. 
the progra~~ of resul&tln8 pr1o• and was•• hU ~n applied 
apuaod1oally and where expecllen1i o'bJeot1Tea h&Ye demanded. 
Only the :l\tt.ure oourae of eY&nta oan reveal the 
extent to 1lb 1oh 1Dflat ton baa atteoted our national eoono.,. 
In all 1U:el1bood, a general. deol1ne 1n th$ 11T1ng etandard 
II&J b• tblt reaUl t • 
1bateTer the outo~ , 1t would appear that 1ntla-
\1onarJ prea•ur•• on the eOODOIIJ ax-e bound to oontinue at, 
leaat. &a long aa defeJUie p~at1ona are under war. The 
J)r1nc1pal adJuatment on tbe part of aanas•ent oona1ata 1n 
wa\Oh1ng ooata ot produotlon aa oloeely &I pola1ble, and 
etteotlng eoonomle• 1n thoae oategor1e• where ther oan be 
made. 
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w1\J:l • tor a maber o~ ,.... to COlle, we neE\ reneft4 
'hr14 war II pl&nalna aa a llaoqr.d 'o the pre••' etton. 
Ill t.raobg ~• World. War Il erp.Jala\1on n .C.ll8bt to ~la\ 
. 
up~ tan \hat trlal-&114-err• _...,., auoh aa were t.bea 
ezplore4 betoN ftDallJ Uhl..,_ tu11 pH4110Uon, ..-. · 
11UUI'i.el Whleh • oo\114 Ill &ttor4 '- NJ»M\ llhoU14 an 
aU..- eaeraeaeJ twelep ... or lJ1 t.b.e t\ltul'e. 
Ia our IMODl IIULP'er we I.Dqu1ft4 mt.• sove~nt 
4et._• p1anntns •l•• tile lAI' .... At. tbla •Y8• or our 
41eouuton we nrt lntwen.o. prJMipaUJ 1n beooai.D6 .. _ 
qQ.a111\ed w1 th u\aM 4etMat IS_. lea aDI t.Mlr twlat10DI; 
aDA of ooune betrbs b alBil P4tHl~lt OoJIPU'laoaa wlth 
old aaenoiea &Dl aetboti. •• ooUlub \hat eo• ettlo1a-
•1• haYe been 'broupt. abou\ lD tt. .., a )'II t•l hne'fv, 
tlMtre la "• t.- &»ul»\ \bat 1 t. • u14 operate • tlrelT 
etteot.lTel7 undal- eor.cU.t.tona •t full. -~U1saUoa. hriher 
1\re.ltntng would l»e neo•ur,. 
bol»le• of 1ft4•tr1&1 --U11&t.10D plamtD8 
.... explored Dest . Ill th 11 ClbapMI' .. npbaalted t,bt arsu-
•nt tba\ lii&DpOWe~ plannins 11 ,. _. t lllport.ad pb.ue • . 
• • alght &44 ~" that DO\ a 111181• au\borltr ••ulte4 . 
41l:r1ns reee .. oh tor th1a paper OONI14en4 •7 otber p~a&a• 
of great ... illport.anoe. narm"as ln tbt pb.uea ot plazlt, a4 
pro4\W' _,. 1D ... oaa• be «eterre4 until tull mol»lllsa-
Uon, but • • a\rongl.J' noo-.a4 that 11anag ... nt 4o u lftloh 
thinking and plaMing 1n the field ot anpower ncnr u would 
'be requ.lreA •ere ••rsenor oondi t1one S..1nent and ant.lolpa-
te4 moment&r11J. 
l'inallJ, we dlaoulaed the UJ8 11'1 which t.wo 1e&4-
1ng oompaniee haw g1Yen reoo¢t1on to the matter of D&t1on-
a.l detenae tt1th1n their respeot1ft organlzat1ona .. Generally, 
we -., oonclude that two balio teat. urea are to be 1nol uded 
in the deeign of a OOmp&IQ' plazu (1) Respona1 b111ty ab.ould 
be placed with top 1Dafta6••nt &Dl a preparecs.n.aa OODIII1ttee 
toraecl oona1at1ng of both atatf and llne eaeoutlYeiJ 
(2) • thorougbgo1ne analr•la mould be made of plant, pro..-
duct, and peraome:J. to d.et_.llti.M~ what probable bpaot upon 
the total organisation lllght be oooaaioned bJ tu.ll national. 
mob1lir..at1on .. Obv1oual.J, when a plan baa been devised 1t 
8hou14 'be nenble enough to ••t ob&J61ng cond1 t1 ona • 
We are ooamitted to a defenee eOOnoiDJ. lfbet.her it 
be or lons or abort duration, the s1sn1t1oant ialpl1cat1on 
tor •naseent 1a that plann\rt.g la and wUl continue to be 
atteoted bJ aetenae aot1Y1t1ea. ConaequentlJ, adJuetment to 
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11'1 the Unlted States 
(1947-51) 
feroent. ot 'foul leroent ot Total 
U,l. lh, 
'' ut. lr1tt..Otr 
... bgland 9.2 3.8 
Borth Atlantlo 21.9 21.8 
South Atlantlo 9.3 10.4 
•orth Otntral 31.5 2'(.0 
Iouth Central 3.9 8.7 
Weat Central 5·5 3.4 
loutJnreat 4.1 14.8 
llountaln 1.1 2.8 
~aoltlo Oout 1·5 7-3 
*16• P• 22. 
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